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Abstract 
This case study aims to identify the elements of Trinidad and Tobago’s foreign policy 
portfolio that allowed it to garner success in promoting its interests in the Kyoto Protocol. 
In doing so, this work will analyze Trinidad and Tobago’s limitations in terms of 
locational, bureaucratic and resource vulnerabilities. Subsequently, a revision of this 
state’s foreign policy portfolio will illustrate its use of capacity building and shaping 
strategies such as contact with institutional and non-state actors, coalition building and 
argumentative strategies, among others. Finally, this work will conclude that these actions 
allowed the promotion of Trinidad and Tobago’s foreign policy agenda through the 
creation of route maps and the coordination of uncertainty in the Kyoto Protocol. To do so, 
this work will focus on examining concepts such as vulnerability and prioritization, while 
also contrasting several different academic articles on the subject and Trinidadian official 
documents.  
Key Words: Small States, Foreign Policy, Prioritization, Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol 
 
Resumen 
Este estudio de caso busca identificar los elementos del portafolio de política exterior de 
Trinidad y Tobago que le permitieron promover exitosamente sus intereses en el Protocolo 
de Kioto. Al hacer esto, este texto analizará las limitaciones de Trinidad y Tobago en 
términos de vulnerabilidades de localización, burocracia y recursos. Posteriormente, una 
revisión del portafolio de política exterior de este Estado ilustrará el uso de estrategias de 
creación de capacidades y de organización como lo son el contacto con actores 
institucionales y no gubernamentales, la formación de coaliciones y estrategias 
argumentativas, entre otras. Finalmente, este artículo concluirá  que dichas acciones 
permitieron la promoción de la agenda de política exterior de Trinidad y Tobago a través 
de la creación de hojas de ruta y la coordinación de la incertidumbre con el Protocolo de 
Kioto. Para hacer esto, este trabajo se concentrará en examinar conceptos como 
vulnerabilidad y priorización, asimismo contrastando diferentes artículos académicos en la 
materia junto con documentos oficiales de Trinidad y Tobago.  
Palabras Clave: Pequeños Estados, Política Exterior, Priorización, Cambio Climático, 
Protocolo de Kioto 
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Small States and the Promotion of Their Foreign Policy Agenda in The International Scenario: 
Trinidad and Tobago and the Kyoto Protocol 
 
The study of small states has been one of the most representative silences in international 
relations theory. Due to the dominant theoretical approaches in the discipline, theorizing about 
small states has not been of great importance for IR scholars. The number of authors that have 
researched small states has been very limited, and the conclusions most have reached are very 
limited as well. One of these conclusions is the dominant thesis in small state studies: their 
limitations do not allow them to be considered as relevant players in international scenarios such 
as international organizations and international regimes. Although this argument pertains to the 
mainstream in the literature on small states, some authors have managed to find dissimilar ideas 
in relation to the possibilities of action for small states.  
 
The growing interest in small states arose due to the fact that they came to amount to a 
significant number of states in the International system (and thus, a representative bloc for 
negotiation). Therefore, it is relevant to note that scenarios such as the Commonwealth of 
Nations and the United Nations have representative proportions of small state membership: the 
Commonwealth has over a third of small state members, while 46 of the 192 member states of 
the United Nations are considered small states, 25 of those identified as Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) (Baldacchino, 2009; Cooper & Shaw, 2009; Prasad, 2009). As a consequence, IR 
scholars developed new conclusions: analyzing limitations was not the only relevant aspect of 
small state studies. Acknowledging this context, an increasing number of authors posited that 
there could be a number of ways for small states to overcome limitations and achieve political 
effects for the promotion of their foreign policy agenda.  
 
Due to these advances in IR theory, the analysis of small state foreign policy has become 
more relevant. Additionally, with global problems and transnational issues becoming a growing 
concern for all states, the study of the possibilities of action for small states in different 
international scenarios has become more pertinent than ever before. Regardless of all the 
advancements in this field of study, the question remains as to the level of significant action 
small states can pursue within international organizations or regimes, especially when it is 
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related to the promotion of their interests in the negotiation agendas of multilateral environments. 
Added to this inquiry, it is still relevant to note the fact that SIDS have an even greater challenge 
in achieving their desired foreign policy objectives because of their resource, bureaucratic and 
locational vulnerabilities (Lewis, 2009). Because of this, SIDS face a greater challenge when 
addressing the imminent reality of climate change, which jeopardizes their survival (AOSIS, 
2014).  
 
It is within this context that understanding the possibilities for action of a small state in a 
multilateral negotiation becomes even more intriguing, pressing and relevant. Hence, one can 
bring to mind the case of climate change negotiations, especially those related to the decisions of 
the United Nations efforts that eventually led to the adoption of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a context that gave birth to the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS). Concurrently, multiple climate change related decisions were made 
during the 1990’s, which not only were a main priority for AOSIS members, but also provided 
the settings in which foreign policy action was more relevant for SIDS in general. It was during 
these years, but more specifically between 1994 and 1997 that ambassador Annette des Iles of 
Trinidad and Tobago’s permanent mission to the UN assumed the pro-tempore presidency of 
AOSIS (Berringer, 2012).  
 
After the finalization of the UNFCCC in 1992, SIDS pushed through for a series of 
commitments, and a Draft Protocol was introduced by AOSIS in 1994, although with very 
limited success (SEDEMA, 2004; Benwell, 2011; McDermott, 2013). Despite the lack of support 
the Draft Protocol had initially, after the Berlin Conference of the Parties and further negotiation, 
the Kyoto Protocol came to be in 1997, including elements of the previously mentioned AOSIS 
Draft (SEDEMA, 2004; Benwell, 2011; McDermott, 2013). 
 
It is safe to assume that AOSIS achieved some level of leadership in the previously 
discussed negotiations. However, as previously set out, IR theory poses serious questions about 
to what extent a state like Trinidad and Tobago would exert such leadership. Additionally, 
another question that arises is whether Trinidad and Tobago could have promoted its own foreign 
policy agenda into the negotiation results of the Kyoto Protocol, especially taking into account 
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its role as one of the first two pro-tempore presidencies of AOSIS in the years leading into the 
Protocols adoption.  
 
Thus, it is this case study’s purpose to identify the elements of the foreign policy 
portfolio of Trinidad and Tobago that allowed it to garner success in promoting its foreign policy 
agenda in the Kyoto Protocol. In doing so, this work will initially assert the limitations Trinidad 
and Tobago may have as a small state within a multilateral negotiation scenario; subsequently 
defend that capacity building and shaping strategies like contact with institutional and non-state 
actors, coalition building and argumentative strategies, among others, allowed the promotion of 
the Trinidadian foreign policy agenda in the negotiations prior to the adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol; and finally, assert that said strategies generated the creation of route maps and the 
coordination of uncertainty with the Kyoto Protocol’s final text.  
 
Trinidad and Tobago as a Small State: Understanding its vulnerabilities 
 
Categorizing states has been as much of a generalized practice of IR theory as 
hypothesizing about the International System and its phenomenon. Consequently, a myriad of 
criteria for categorizing states exists in IR literature, which has represented a challenge when the 
objective is to understand what a Small state is. There is not a singular definition that firmly 
stands paramount to all others with explicit criteria defining the necessary qualifications for a 
state to be classified as a small state (Baldacchino, 2009). As Neumann and Gstöhl put it: “The 
lack of an agreed concrete definition of small states has also very much marked the body of 
literature that might be termed small state studies.” (Neumann & Gsthöl, 2004, p. 7). This is 
especially true when considering the different criteria used when defining small states.  
 
Initially, any state that did not represent a great power or a middle power was considered 
a small state (Neumann & Gsthöl, 2004). Due to this appreciation, many small states were often 
confused with weak states (Neumann & Gsthöl, 2004). For some authors, small states could be 
understood by analyzing parameters often associated with population size, territory size, 
geographic location, Human Development Index, GDP, the levels of openness and of 
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dependency on external aid, military power, among others (Martínez, 2013). These criteria 
became another alternative when defining small states, under some “more objective” elements.  
 
Nonetheless, an additional complication when defining small states resides in the 
consideration of size being a social construction, rather than an objectively given fact 
(Baldacchino, 2009; Panke, 2012). Because of the constructed nature of state size, some authors 
place importance in the relational component of size. Hence, these authors consider that a state is 
only big or small when it is characterized in relation to another in a particular context 
(Baldacchino, 2009; Lewis, 2009; Panke, 2012). This could lead to a state being considered as 
small in a determined scenario, but as big in a different one.  
 
As such, defining small states may be dependent on the context in which one is analyzing 
state action. Thus, Panke focused in the specific scenario of negotiation settings, by claiming: “A 
small state can be defined as a state with less than average financial resources in a particular 
negotiation setting” (Panke, 2012, p. 316). Through this definition, “small states” would not be a 
concept pertaining to capabilities in every context, but to one very specific scenario of 
multilateral and international negotiations.  
 
However, defining small states has another complication when considering an additional 
category: microstates. “Microstates” becomes a competing concept with “small states”, 
consequently blurring the already unclear differentiation between state sizes. One possible 
definition for “microstate” is a state whose claim of effective sovereignty is questioned to some 
degree by another state, and accordingly being unable to maintain a representative international 
presence due to a lack (or perceived lack) of resources (Neumann & Gsthöl, 2004). Furthermore, 
in some sense, authors consider microstates as an even more limited form of state size.  
 
Nevertheless, one could argue there is some level of agreement on some common 
elements. For example, the World Bank uses a threshold of a population of 1.5 million or under 
to consider a state as a small, and this has been thoroughly supported in many other cases 
(Commonwealth Advisory Group, 1997; Mohamed, 2002; Independent Evaluation Group, 2006; 
Cooper & Shaw, 2009).  
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Though varied definitions may exist when explaining small states, a shared concept for 
most authors and policy makers when discussing them is that of vulnerability (Braveboy-
Wagner, 2009). Chong defines it as follows: “Vulnerability is ... the consequence of the 
interaction of two sets of factors: (1) the incidence and intensity of risk and threat, and (2) the 
ability to withstand risks and threats (resistance) and to “bounce back” from their consequences 
(resilience)” (Chong, 2009, p. 65). On that account, vulnerability represents both the negative 
effects that the international system may pose to a state, as well as its ability to respond to said 
externalities. Moreover, three particular vulnerabilities have been identified that are crucial for 
the understanding of this case study. As Lewis describes it, these three vulnerabilities are:  
(i) Vulnerabilities deriving from the physical location of the state which we may refer to as 
locational or territorial vulnerabilities;   
(ii) The extent of the administrative coherence (a function in part of the social coherence) of the 
state and the vulnerabilities arising in respect of the management of the state’s policy operations 
and the stability of its decision-making – we can refer to this as the extent of the state’s Domestic 
Political Efficiency (…) 
(iii) The nature and extent of economic vulnerability of the state as an economic unit of particular 
geographical size in relation to both domestic resources and the networks of international 
transactions in which it is involved. (Lewis, 2009, p. ix) 
Therefore, it is possible to consider these three vulnerabilities as the core limitations for small 
state action. These three limitations (location or territorial; bureaucratic and resource 
vulnerabilities) shape how small states perceive themselves, and consequently, how they conduct 
their foreign policy.  
 
After considering all of the previously mentioned elements, it is relevant to ponder 
whether or not Trinidad and Tobago is a small state. The initial concern would be considering 
population size: Trinidad and Tobago fits the description with a population of 1.2 million 
(Trevino, 2012; CIA, 2016), with some authors even considering it a microstate (Braveboy-
Wagner, 2010). But in order to fully analyze Trinidad and Tobago as a small state, it is necessary 
to understand each of the previously explained limitations. After all, as Baldacchino asserts: 
“vulnerabilities rather than opportunities are the most striking consequence of smallness” 
(Baldacchino, 2009, p. 21) 
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Locational or Territorial Vulnerabilities 
Considering the locational or territorial vulnerability of small states, it is key to consider 
all relevant aspects of its physical location. As is widely known, most small states are SIDS, and 
that represents a level of remoteness and insularity that translates into higher transportation costs 
and isolation from major markets (Independent Evaluation Group, 2006; Prasad, 2009). 
Paradoxically, this isolation was somewhat heightened with the development and improvement 
in transportation technologies. As ships and fleets advanced, SIDS lost functions as ports or 
refreshment stations, resulting in a more relegated position (McDermott, 2013). It is also relevant 
to note how this isolation is not only understood in the geographical sense. As will be further 
analyzed in the section discussing bureaucratic vulnerabilities, this geographical isolation 
generates isolation in the diplomatic sense as well (Lewis, 2009; Prasad, 2009).  
 
Also worth considering is the transportation costs between islands. As Mohamed 
indicates: “owing to the remoteness of islands from one another, transport and communication 
between islands is extremely costly and the provision of public service to the islands is difficult 
and expensive” (Mohamed, 2002, p. 3). As an archipelago state, Trinidad and Tobago also faces 
this vulnerability.  
 
Additionally, these small states are frequently located in regions that could be easily 
affected by natural or climatic events that also have effects on the states’ economy and 
population (Independent Evaluation Group, 2006; Cooper & Shaw, 2009). In the relevant context 
of the Caribbean states, where Trinidad and Tobago is located, it is particularly important to 
note: 
Small island developing states (SIDS) as those of the Caribbean, would appear to be particularly 
vulnerable to the negative impacts of sea level rise, in view of the fragility of the physical 
systems, the intense land use of coastal locations and the lack of economic resources to 
adequately implement mitigation strategies (Singh, 1997, p. 95).  
As can be seen, Trinidad and Tobago faces challenges posed by these locational 
characteristics because of possible effects on its territory. Some of these consequences include 
incidents like inundation of low-lying coastal areas, coastal erosion, flooding and coral 
bleaching, to name a few	  (Singh, 1997; Thorburn, 2007; Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Prasad, 2009; 
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Braveboy-Wagner, 2010). The threat of sea level rise becomes especially acute for those small 
states with small and low-lying land areas since the most minimal sea level rise could represent a 
complete submersion (Baldacchino, 2009). Although Trinidad and Tobago does not face this 
imminent catastrophic scenario in its entirety, it does have a significant number of areas that 
could face this dread future.  
 
Climate change represents a particular complication for this vulnerability that SIDS such 
as Trinidad and Tobago face. As Bily argues: “Warmer water also increases the frequency and 
the intensity of tropical storms and disrupts corals and fish that are important to these nations’ 
economies” (Bily, 2010, p. 43). This concern is fundamental for Trinidad and Tobago because 
Trinidad’s capital of Port of Spain is particularly vulnerable to tropical storms (McDermott, 
2013). Nonetheless, considering these impacts as exclusively environmental would be a mistake: 
estimates on the economic impact of climate change on small states amount to 200% of GDP 
(Benwell, 2011).  
 
Definitely, locational vulnerabilities represent a very important limitation to small state 
action, and that is certainly the case for Trinidad and Tobago. As McDermott argues, climate 
change has hit small states severely: “like a blow to a downed boxer, layering environmental 
vulnerability atop political and economic forms” (McDermott, 2013, p. 576). Since SIDS face 
such pressing issues in relation to climate change, their vulnerability has been heightened and 
recognized internationally. Although this vulnerability is a great limitation for the foreign policy 
action of small states, it has become a key element to achieve some level of recognition 
internationally.  
 
Bureaucratic Vulnerabilities 
Comparably to those of the locational and territorial nature, small states have a series of 
vulnerabilities they face related to political institutions and internal bureaucracies. This is the 
case for most small states due to a lack of administrative resources, which is an expected 
consequence of having faced the high and rising costs of independence fairly recently, as some 
small states have barely reached 60 years of independence	   (Neumann & Gsthöl, 2004). This is 
certainly the case for Trinidad and Tobago, as Braveboy-Wagner illustrates:  
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When Trinidad became independent, it was extremely unprepared to deal with foreign policy and, 
as noted by the then-Permanent Representative to the UN, policies were evolved by the prime 
minister and a few close advisers with minimal input from the foreign policy bureaucracy 
(Braveboy-Wagner, 1989, p. 54) 
Trinidad and Tobago did eventually achieve a more institutionalized foreign policy formulation, 
but decision making in this area does remain excessively personalized.  
 
Small states face several complications in terms of their bureaucratic vulnerabilities. 
Insufficiently staffed diplomatic missions, poorly trained and equipped home offices, scarce 
resources, lack of coordination between ministries, among other issues plague decision makers 
and foreign policy enactors in small states (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989; Mohamed, 2002). 
 
The main bureaucratic vulnerability is the lack of human resources, or financial resources 
to allocate the existing personnel. As some authors note, even when small states focus on 
specific thematic areas like climate change, these states experience limited participation due to 
having fewer international diplomats and field experts who struggle to cope with complex 
multilateral negotiations (Mohamed, 2002; Benwell, 2011). Diana Panke elaborates on this idea:  
Available budgets influence the number of personnel and experts in government and the 
ministries back home who are available to develop national negotiation positions on the basis of 
which diplomats can actively participate in international negotiations in the first place (Panke, 
2012, p. 315).  
A series of results can be deduced due to budget limitations in national offices. For example, 
small states tend to be slower when formulating national interests for negotiations in 
international scenarios (Panke, 2012). The effects are not reduced only to delays, but also in 
terms of argumentative strategies. This bureaucratic vulnerability leads to having difficulties in 
creating compelling arguments, as well as generating long-lasting expertise in diplomatic 
missions and foreign ministries alike (Panke, 2012).  
 
Nonetheless, budgets are not only a limitation for internal affairs, because: “Budgets 
influence the size of delegations that ultimately defend the national position at the negotiation 
table” (Panke, 2012, p. 315). Another very representative bureaucratic limitation occurs in a less 
noticeable manner than other negative effects of budget and personnel restrictions. This is the 
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case of how having few diplomatic personnel both at home and abroad represents higher 
workloads (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Panke, 2012). Several consequences arise from this fact, as 
Panke illustrates. Higher workloads lead to: firstly, delays in formulation and execution of 
foreign policy; secondly, topics in which small states prefer to withhold from negotiation due to 
being unable to articulate a national position; thirdly, less engagement in networking with other 
states and institutional actors; fourthly, limited overview of the interests of other states, 
preventing issue linkage or compromises/concessions (Panke, 2012). All of these effects 
represent less international activity for small states, fewer possibilities to develop arguments or 
to simply promote their interests. 
 
As stated before, small states cope with having limited diplomatic representation abroad, 
as they have an average of 4 to 7 diplomatic missions, and usually, SIDS have even fewer 
(Mohamed, 2002). With limited resources, small states prefer to maintain fewer diplomatic 
missions in limited geographical areas. Other studies find more specific patterns when analyzing 
the diplomatic missions of small states. In general, SIDS choose to establish diplomatic missions 
in their former colonial power, their most important neighbor and a permanent mission to the 
United Nations (Mohamed, 2002).	  Trinidad and Tobago has been above this trend: in 2000, there 
were 11 Diplomatic Missions abroad, and 22 Embassies in Trinidadian territory (Mohamed, 
2002). Table 1 demonstrates how these were geographically distributed, and how the data is for 
current diplomatic missions abroad. On the other hand, Table 2 illustrates the trend on the 
different diplomatic missions that Trinidad and Tobago has received. As Table 2 indicates, and 
as Mohamed reinforces: “The pattern of diplomatic representations in microstates (…) suggests 
that the more advanced countries do not engage with microstates any more than the latter does 
with the former” (Mohamed, 2002, p. 22) 
 
Table 1. Trinidadian Diplomatic Missions Abroad 
 Africa Asia Europe Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
North 
America 
Pacific Diplomatic 
Missions 
Total 
2000 1 1 2 3 2 0 2 11 
2016 3 2 2 6 2 0 2 17 
Sources: (Mohamed, 2002), (Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 2016a).  
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Table 2. Foreign Diplomatic Missions in Trinidad and Tobago 
 Africa Asia Europe Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
North 
America 
Pacific Total 
2000 1 3 6 10 2 0 22 
2016 2 4 7 14 3 1 31 
Sources: (Mohamed, 2002), (Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 2016b). 
 
Since small states lack the necessary resources to establish more diplomatic missions 
abroad, small states are not only selective with these, but also more dependent on diplomacy in 
multilateral scenarios (permanent missions). Through this method, small states can lower the 
costs that bilateral representations embody in their international relations  (Mohamed, 2002). As 
a consequence, the United Nations is one of the most used Organizations to overcome this 
problem of non-representation through the small states’ permanent missions. In the Trinidadian 
case, the Heads of Government Conferences for Caribbean states was another important channel 
for Trinidadian foreign policy. Nonetheless, the 1975 Conference was postponed, which posed a 
great challenge for Trinidad and Tobago. Braveboy-Wagner asserts: “As a result, this major 
channel for Trinidadian influence was lost until 1982” (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989, p. 48). 
 
Trinidad and Tobago initial sought regional integration after its independence, as shown 
with initiatives like the Heads of Government Conferences. Other similar actions were also a 
priority for Trinidadian foreign policy:  
Indeed since 1967 (with effect from 1968) it has been a member of a regional free trade area (the 
Caribbean Free Trade Area, CARIFTA), which was elevated to a common market and 
community in 1973–1974 (the Caribbean Community, CARICOM) (Braveboy-Wagner, 2010, p. 
414).  
Nevertheless, this determination was met with reluctance in the Caribbean neighboring states 
during the 1980s. Thus, as Braveboy-Wagner explains: “Trinidad responded to the decline in 
regional collaboration by adopting a low-profile, downgrading its participation in regional 
meetings and withdrawing from regional activism, even while maintaining its high level of 
economic contributions.” (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989, p. 46). As a consequence, Trinidad and 
Tobago pursued different fronts in order to gain influence and reduce its bureaucratic 
vulnerabilities: although it sought to join OPEC, the Organization declined this application. This 
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decision was motivated because of Trinidad’s small production base and OPEC’s reluctance to 
welcome more Latin American and Caribbean members (Braveboy-Wagner, 2010). In this way, 
Trinidad and Tobago was allocating limited resources into other areas, similarly to how another 
state would. The fact these efforts were unsuccessful highlight the imminent reality of the 
bureaucratic vulnerabilities Trinidad and Tobago has faced.  
 
These circumstances gave way to a series of trial and error moments in Trinidadian 
foreign policy in the Caribbean. Trinidad and Tobago served as an intermediary in the 
Venezuela-Guyana border dispute in 1970, yet failed to limit Venezuela’s growing influence in 
the region (which it hoped to do by being a mediator state) (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989). Another 
relevant event hindered Trinidadian influence in the following years. This episode was the failure 
of Trinidad to articulate an effective plan (or rather, any stand at all) in relation to the People’s 
Revolutionary Government in Grenada (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989). Adding to the already 
pressing difficulties Trinidad and Tobago faced due to bureaucratic vulnerabilities, the 
Trinidadian decision to withdraw came at a cost. It was not until 1982 that the Heads of 
Government Conference convened again, with Trinidad having lost its leadership role to Jamaica 
and Barbados (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989).  
 
The issue of brain drain can also represent a limitation in bureaucratic terms. Trinidad 
and Tobago, as many other small states, faces significant emigration that becomes the reality of 
brain drain (Prasad, 2009). This can represent educated and specialized people leaving the state 
for better opportunities, somewhat preserving the issues of untrained personnel in the 
Trinidadian Foreign Service. Trinidad and Tobago certainly faces this issue, and as Braveboy-
Wagner puts it: “The greatest need is for very specialised staff at a time when skilled and 
educated personnel are attracted to better-paying opportunities in the private sector and 
elsewhere” (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009, p. 112). 
 
Trinidad and Tobago has an additional element in its political institutions that generates 
another bureaucratic vulnerability. As Trinidad and Tobago is a Parliamentary Democracy, 
parliamentarians have some level of incidence in foreign policy decision-making. However, as 
Ince can exemplify: “Parliamentarians are, as a rule, elected on domestic matters, and only on 
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very rare occasions are elections won on or lost on foreign policy issues” (Ince, 1976, p. 282). 
This represents a significant limitation in foreign policy formulation since most parliamentarians 
are uninterested, and uninformed about foreign policy and foreign affairs issues. But most 
importantly, most parliamentarians have no incentive or opportunity to acquire knowledge in 
these areas, because: “their political future depends on keeping in close touch with their voters 
and thereby securing nomination and re-election” (Ince, 1976, p. 282).  
 
The persistent lack of coordination between Foreign Affairs and Trade ministries is 
another issues that small states face (Mohamed, 2002; Braveboy-Wagner, 1989). This lack of 
communication also happens in the cases of other ministries inside of small states that eventually 
carry out international functions. Many ministries in small states have established their own 
mini-foreign affairs units (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009), causing the foreign affairs ministry to lose 
its “gatekeeper” position in foreign affairs (Mohamed, 2002). This in turn represents an issue that 
because of a negative effect over the workforce in the foreign affairs ministries. As Braveboy-
Wagner indicates: “Major international activities are undertaken by other ministries without any 
input from the foreign ministry, leaving foreign ministry personnel marginalised and too often 
demoralised” (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009, p. 111).  
 
In sum, most of these bureaucratic vulnerabilities exist due to issues on resource 
allocation, a very important factor to consider when establishing and dividing functions between 
foreign affairs actors at home and abroad. Consequently, the understanding of resource 
vulnerabilities allows the full comprehension of the picture on small state vulnerability.   
 
Resource or Economic Vulnerabilities 
As explained above, the lack of resources is one of the key causes for bureaucratic issues 
pertaining to lack of representation abroad. Definitely, financial resources are paramount for the 
successful participation of states in international negotiations within international scenarios. 
Additionally, due to resource limitations, and the previously mentioned bureaucratic 
vulnerabilities, small states endure more challenges when convincingly threatening other states 
with culminating collaboration and acting in a unilateral manner instead (Panke, 2012). Thus, 
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small states usually can’t work with these strategies when negotiating agreements or 
compromises/concessions.  
 
Likewise, a number of other limitations present themselves to small states due to 
economic vulnerabilities. One such issue is scarcity. Neumann and Gstöhl contend how scarcity 
caused by physical smallness produces external economic dependence (Neumann & Gsthöl, 
2004). Small states are described as economically weak because of a lack of resources, or a lack 
of appropriate mobilization to put those resources to good use (Mohamed, 2002). This is a 
complicated scenario for small states, since it represents the existence of limited economic 
diversification. “Because of narrow resource bases and small domestic markets, the production 
base and exports of small states are often undiversified” (Independent Evaluation Group, 2006, 
p. 2). This dependence on undiversified production bases and unpredictable markets heightens 
small state resource vulnerabilities (Braveboy-Wagner, 2010).  
 
Limited resources also generate a sense of helplessness in the collective or individual 
efforts to advance policies dealing with climate change and its adverse effects (Singh, 1997). As 
mentioned before, small states are particularly vulnerable because of climate change. As Singh 
states: “One would expect to see impacts on several socio-economic sectors, especially the 
climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture and forestry, energy, health and tourism” (Singh, 
1997, p. 95). Failing to have resources for mitigation and foreseeing negative effects adds to this 
sense of helplessness. Since most of the small, low-lying AOSIS member states would face 
damages on their economic bases due to rising sea levels, ocean acidification and adverse effects 
on fertile fishing ground (Berringer, 2012), the before mentioned sense of helplessness surges 
understandably.  
 
Small states also face limitations in terms of elevated costs. One such type of limitation is 
that of institutional capacity constraints, understood as the higher per capita costs that small 
states face when providing public services (Independent Evaluation Group, 2006). Some authors 
have highlighted how economic vulnerability is understood in features such as remoteness and 
isolation, which represent high transport costs; and vulnerability to natural disasters and the costs 
	   15 
associated with mitigation and disaster relief (Prasad, 2009). As can be seen, SIDS face a series 
of costs that are hard to provide for with the already limited resources.  
 
As explained before, the traditional view of small states as weak also resulted from the 
consideration that small states represented small economies. Although European small states did 
not fall into this description SIDS perfectly fit the part. Small states previously functioned as the 
locations for primary production and supply to colonial rulers, and thus have maintained varying 
phases of dependence on ongoing preferential trade relationships with their former colonizers 
(Thorburn, 2007). As a consequence, SIDS are heavily dependent on external trade and foreign 
investment in order to overcome their resource limitations (Independent Evaluation Group, 
2006). Neumann and Gstöhl mainly explain this:  
Small economies were assumed to be more dependent on external trade than bigger states to tend to 
have trade deficits, to depend often on a single commodity of export, and to hardly export any 
industrial goods requiring a high intensity of capital or research (Neumann & Gsthöl, 2004, p. 10) 
Most of these facts continue to be true; however, Trinidad and Tobago seems to have 
experienced a series of relevant exceptions.  
 
At first glance, Trinidad’s trade relations with the Caribbean region do not necessarily 
reflect what characterizes a small state in terms of economic vulnerability. As Braveboy-Wagner 
identifies, Trinidad’s exports to CARICOM states have at times been 3 times larger than its 
imports (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989). Trinidad and Tobago has been lucky enough to have a supply 
of important petroleum reserves and as discovered in the 1990s, gas reserves as well (Braveboy-
Wagner, 1989). Notably, most of Trinidad’s exports CARICOM have been petroleum and its 
products. However, if these were excluded from trade balance considerations, Trinidadian 
surpluses would transform into deficits (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989). Despite this fact, Trinidad 
and Tobago could claim that its per capita Gross National Product was the highest in the region 
(Braveboy-Wagner, 1989), nowadays still being one of the highest.  
 
However, Trinidadian petroleum reserves have failed to function as relevant foreign 
policy tools. Trinidad not only failed in achieving membership status in OPEC as previously 
described, but it also never managed to garner a level of influence or grateful dependents through 
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its Petroleum initiative in the Caribbean (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989; McDermott, 2013). As it is 
easy to note, interest in Venezuelan petroleum had started decades ago in the Caribbean region, 
adding to Trinidadian frustration (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989; Bryan, 2009; Cooper & Shaw, 
2009). Evidently, Trinidad dreaded this Venezuelan action in the region seeing it as hindering its 
own interests. As Bryan illustrates: “Trinidad and Tobago was concerned that its state-owned 
Petrotrin refinery stood to lose about 30 per cent of its sales of petroleum products, fuel oil, 
diesel, and gasoline to the Caribbean” (Bryan, 2009, p. 141). Consequently, one could assert that 
even though Trinidad and Tobago has a significant resource in its energy reserves, its 
overreliance on it and its inability to adequately use it as a foreign policy tool exemplify the 
resource and economic vulnerabilities of a small state.  
 
After the thorough examination of the different types of vulnerabilities, it would be in 
order to question if small states are doomed to lack any advantage for the promotion of their 
interests. Nevertheless, that is not the case, and several authors contend for a different approach 
that analyzes small state action in spite of vulnerabilities. As Braveboy-Wagner sustains:  
A weak power approach introduces a very different dimension to the study of resilience. 
Essentially it aims to show that there are indeed some small states that may be not only resilient 
enough to deal with global economic pressures but also proactive enough to locate spaces in the 
international system where they might be able to successfully promote their interests (Braveboy-
Wagner, 2010, p. 410).  
Concurrently, this case study seeks to understand how Trinidad and Tobago aimed to 
successfully locate such spaces for the promotion of its interests. The strategy that Trinidad and 
Tobago employs is Prioritization, coined by Diana Panke, which will be further explained in the 
next section.  
 
Prioritization as Trinidad and Tobago’s Mechanism to Overcome its Limitations 
 
Although the theoretical mainstream dismisses small states as unable of exerting some 
level of influence in multilateral negotiation settings, some authors dissent with this idea. For 
example, Keohane and Nye have argued that IR theory should rather question smallness within 
specific "issue areas", thus considering that small states hold great issue-specific power 
(Neumann & Gsthöl, 2004). Likewise, as Payne denotes: “An excessive preoccupation with 
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vulnerability easily leads to defeatist, misinformed and inappropriate diplomacies” (Payne, 2009, 
p. 283).  
 
As Panke illustrates, the method for small states to successfully have some level of 
impact on the international level is prioritization (Panke, 2012). With the existing vulnerabilities 
and lack of assets, resource allocation is key for small states. Thus, prioritization resides in 
ensuring the investment of their power resources in the issues that are high priority agenda items 
for them (Panke, 2012). It is through prioritization that small states find two different set of 
strategies that help them in negotiation settings to the fullest: capacity building strategies and 
shaping strategies.  
 
Capacity Building Strategies 
Diana Panke defines capacity building strategies as those that: “are employed not to 
directly influence negotiation outcomes, but to improve the conditions to do so with specific 
shaping strategies” (Panke, 2012, p. 318). In other words, these are the strategies that help small 
states acquire more assets to improve the conditions prior to a negotiation. Panke describes the 
existence of three main types of capacity building strategies: contact with institutional actors; 
contact with NGO’s, epistemic communities and industries; and creating institutional memory 
(Panke, 2012). The first strategy allows small states to increase knowledge on a subject matter, 
as well as the different positions on said subject. This is achieved through contacting 
international secretariats and chairs that provide additional background information on the item 
of the agenda that is in negotiation (Panke, 2012).  
 
The second strategy provides small states with an opportunity to increase knowledge on 
the subject matter, strengthening arguments and reducing the burden on the limited personnel at 
home or abroad (Panke, 2012). This strategy clearly illustrates how the small state seeks to act 
despite its vulnerabilities, even if contacting NGOs, epistemic communities and industry 
lobbyists is unconventional. The acquired knowledge is a very powerful resource, which can 
later on be used in shaping strategies (Panke, 2012).  
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Finally, the third strategy consists in the creation of institutional memory by learning 
from the past experiences, which increases the expertise on how negotiations work. As Panke 
states: “The longer a small state is a member of a particular international organization or regime, 
the more easily it can counterbalance size-related disadvantages” (Panke, 2012, p. 318). Thus, 
small states can position diplomats for longer periods of time, aiming to ensure a good 
generational relay inside of diplomatic missions and to strengthen networks internally and 
outwards. As Trinidad and Tobago has certainly used these strategies at its disposal, it is relevant 
to study how some of them even directly improved its conditions in the UNFCCC negotiations 
and specifically in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations.  
 
Institutional actors. One example of Trinidadian contact with institutional actors is how 
Trinidad and Tobago hosted the first meeting in the English-speaking Caribbean of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989). Another 
relevant scenario for small states has been the Commonwealth, as was previously mentioned, 
because: “The Commonwealth Secretariat, in particular, has ushered in a range of studies 
focused on ‘small states” (Baldacchino, 2009, p. 24). Trinidad and Tobago has also made use of 
UN institutions inside its own territory. For example, the national government has joined with 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in several occasions for a multiplicity of 
development initiatives (Berringer, 2012).  
 
Small states also focus on being elected for relevant positions inside UN settings or other 
international organizations. This strategy has succeeded in several occasions, attaining 
achievements such as Trinidad and Tobago having occupied the position of assistant secretary-
general in the Organization of American States (OAS) (Braveboy-Wagner, 2010). Through these 
actions, small states strengthen their relations with institutional actors like the Secretary General 
of the OAS, while also strengthening institutional memory. Trinidad and Tobago also managed 
to achieve other relevant positions inside of the UN, such as the vice-presidency of the General 
Assembly in 1966 and the chairmanship of several General Assembly committees (Braveboy-
Wagner, 2009). Additionally, Angela Cropper, the second advisor who had accompanied Lincoln 
Myers to Geneva in 1990 (and a relevant figure for the birth of AOSIS as will be explained 
further on) eventually became deputy secretary-general of the United Nations Environment 
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Programme in 2007 (McDermott, 2013). These positions allowed Trinidad and Tobago to not 
only strengthen its relations with institutional actors, but also generate institutional memory 
inside its own Permanent Mission to the UN.  
 
Another example of just how successful small states were in creating relations with 
institutional actors is the good relation they had with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. There 
are two possible repercussions of this relation: in 1994, the focus on SIDS was brought to 
international recognition inside of the UN at the United Nations Conference on Small Island 
Developing States (Lewis, 2009). Moreover, as an initiative led by small states and the Secretary 
General, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Sustainable 
Development (UNDSEA) demanded the establishment of a SIDS division in 1995 (Berringer, 
2012). Additionally, Kofi Annan himself said: “The small States of the world...are more than 
capable of holding their own...their contributions are the very glue of progressive international 
cooperation for the common good” (Benwell, 2011, p. 207).  
 
However, none of these is the most significant success of small states in negotiation 
settings. As Benwell indicates: “The most important institutional process achievement by small 
states has been to secure a special seat on the Conference of the Parties (COP) Bureau, alongside 
the five UN regional groupings” (Benwell, 2011, p. 204). Through this achievement, small states 
achieved becoming an active group inside of UNFCCC negotiations, while fostering their 
contact with other institutional actors. Although Trinidad and Tobago did not occupy this seat, it 
did become a key aspect for the usage of other shaping strategies, added to the benefit of contact 
with Samoa (who did occupy it) as an institutional actor itself. This decision also set a precedent 
for SIDS’ representation in other instances, like the Kyoto compliance Branches after the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (Benwell, 2011).  
 
NGOs, Epistemic Communities And Industry Lobbies. The issue of climate change 
has generated a symbiotic relationship between the scientific community and small states. On 
one hand, scientist have benefited from state actors inside UN negotiations pushing for the 
petitions they make that otherwise wouldn’t be heard. On the other hand, small states like 
Trinidad and Tobago have used the arguments of scientists to gather extra knowledge that 
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eventually strengthens their position for negotiations. For example, it is relevant to see what 
Singh explains: “It is a widely held belief among scientists, environmental advocacy groups and 
politicians in the small island developing states (SIDS) of the Caribbean, that global warming 
and sea level rise are being imposed upon them by the developed world” (Singh, 1997, p. 95). 
This has also allowed small states to utilize science as a way to “depoliticize” the debate 
(Benwell, 2011). 
 
AOSIS, as a lobby group in which Trinidad and Tobago had a very important role that 
will be further analyzed in this case study, had several events where contact with different actors 
was encouraged and fundamental. As an example, the Workshop on the Clean Development 
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol was hosted by AOSIS in 1999, counting with attendees from 
states like the Philippines, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Norway, New 
Zealand, and Switzerland (Bily, 2010).  
 
Institutional memory. Generating institutional memory is never easy, but small states 
have found mechanisms to do so. As previously mentioned before, the Trinidadian period as 
assistant secretary general as well as the special seat in COP Bureau have helped. Yet another 
different strategy that has helped to generate institutional memory is the rotational characteristic 
of the AOSIS chairperson. This position has been held by Vanuatu, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Samoa, Mauritius, Saint Lucia, Grenada, Maldives and Nauru (Berringer, 2012; AOSIS, 2015). 
Most importantly, Ambassador Annette des Iles of Trinidad and Tobago held the position from 
1994 to 1997 (Berringer, 2012; AOSIS, 2015).  
 
Shaping Strategies  
Panke describes shaping strategies as the set of actions that small states have at their 
disposal in order to influence negotiation outcomes (Panke, 2012). These strategies include: (Re-
) framing; Causal/ technical arguing; Moral arguing/shaming; Legal arguing; Coalition building; 
bargaining; and Value-Claiming. The first is related to the ability of states to influence 
negotiation outcomes through the manipulation of how the negotiation takes place and how the 
issue is perceived by framing or re-framing the debate (that is, changing the frame again) (Panke, 
2012). This strategy even has an additional advantage for small states: “if they are regarded as 
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having little self-interest at stake, they may be more likely to convincingly frame a policy as 
either being in the common interest or as relating to fairness” (Panke, 2012, p. 320).  
 
The second, third and fourth strategy are related to the argument types small states may 
use. The first of these is that of causal or technical arguments that arise, for example, after using 
capacity building strategies to gather knowledge on a specific issue area. Through this kind of 
strategy, small states can manage to be considered as interested in the best policy rather than 
themselves (Panke, 2012). Thus, small states achieve the previously mentioned depoliticizing 
effect (Benwell, 2011). The second type of argumentative strategy is the use of moral and 
normative claims. This is the use of institutionalized logics of appropriateness, thus 
delegitimizing positions contrary to those presented by the small state that in theory campaigns 
for international values and norms (Panke, 2012). Again, this is a strategy that allows small states 
to seem as impartial in negotiation settings. The final strategy related to argument type is that of 
using legal arguments. Similarly to the previous strategy, small states use the acquired 
impartialness and motivate other states to act according to international law (Panke, 2012).  
 
The fifth strategy is one that has traditionally been used in all international negotiation 
settings, and that is coalition building. Nonetheless, it is much more useful for small states 
because of a series of elements. Particularly in scenarios where the quantity of actors is very 
high, coalitions can influence outcomes (Panke, 2012). Thus, small states can achieve to speak 
out and vote coherently and in harmony, echoing their positions and achieving greater attention 
(or even support). It is also important to highlight how coalition building signifies a 
representative cost reduction for small states, adequately addressing multiple-actor scenarios 
(Neumann & Gsthöl, 2004). Panke also demonstrates a relationship between this strategy and 
other shaping strategies: “In order to increase the number of actors within a coalition and in order 
to maximize internal coherency, coalition leaders can apply the various argumentative, framing 
and bargaining strategies” (Panke, 2012, p. 321).  
 
The sixth strategy is related to bargaining, which means gaining influence via demands, 
threats, concessions and/or offers (Panke, 2012). However, this strategy is complicated for small 
states to use, because of all the previously mentioned vulnerabilities, especially resource 
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limitations. Yet, another possibility arises if all states are engaging in bargaining save from small 
states. If the negotiation setting is like the one previously described, small states can work as 
neutral mediators or “honest brokers”, having the possibility to introduce interests while being in 
this seemingly neutral position (Panke, 2012).  
 
The final strategy is that of value-claiming actions. For this strategy, small states can achieve 
successes in negotiation settings by attaining the benefits of the “ first move”. As Panke 
describes:  
First-movers make the first proposition of how to resolve a distributional conflict and thereby define 
the situation and shift the baseline for acceptable outcomes towards their own ideal position (…) As a 
consequence the second mover can only offer counter- proposals within a margin (Panke, 2012, p. 
322).  
This is especially beneficial for small states as they become more relevant if they are setting a 
position, than if they were intervening the negotiation at the end of the process. With the plethora 
of shaping strategies, it is relevant to question which strategies Trinidad and Tobago used, and 
how effective they were in achieving effects in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations.  
 
Framing/reframing. Trinidad and Tobago has used framing and reframing strategies to 
garner success in international negotiations, especially those related to the UNFCCC. Initially, it 
is relevant to consider how Trinidad and Tobago managed to frame locational vulnerabilities as 
more important than the energy production policies it was pursuing. Thus, as McDermott 
elaborates:  
The predator became prey, or so one would have observed from outside the victim slot. Yet, so 
powerful was this category that in three domains— physical geography, international diplomacy, and 
vulnerability assessment—it rendered Trinidad’ s complex, agroindustrial story as a flat narrative of 
innocence. And innocence amounts to a license to pollute (McDermott, 2013, p. 572).  
As stated above, the team composed by Lincoln Myers (then Minister of Environment), Angela 
Cropper and Leo Heileman presented Trinidad and Tobago as an innocent victim of climate 
change in the climate change negations of the 1990s. However, the reality was very different:  
Trinidad’ s per capita emissions in 1990 were three times as much of the next highest AOSIS 
member (McDermott, 2013). Of course, one could expect said action. None of the 
representatives would jeopardize their country’s hydrocarbon industry, which made reframing 
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the perception of Trinidad and Tobago an easy way to make other states focus on the effects 
instead than the causes of climate change (McDermott, 2013).  
 
Consequently, Trinidad and Tobago benefited from this “victim” perception throughout 
the 1990s, although it did face some challenges eventually. For example, the 1992 Rio Summit 
was an awkward situation for the Trinidadian team, as they had to remain silent, to avoid being 
called at for their policies (McDermott, 2013). But not all framing strategies used by Trinidad 
and Tobago have been used to hide its own wrongdoings. Trinidad and Tobago participated 
actively in the 1994 Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States, a key meeting that strengthened the concept of SIDS, situating these states in 
the international agenda, and reaching the Barbados Programme of Action (BPoA) (Trevino, 
2012; McDermott, 2013).  
 
Causal/technical arguments. In association with capacity building strategies, Trinidad 
and Tobago managed to use causal and technical arguments that arose from the gathered 
knowledge. For example, action through the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) made Trinidad and Tobago one promoter of better terms of trade and 
the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) as relevant tools for the 
empowerment of SIDS, and as mechanisms to improve conditions for climate change prevention 
and mitigation (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989).  
 
As stated before, the BPoA also allowed Trinidad and Tobago to use technical arguments related 
to SIDS and sustainable development (Baldacchino, 2009; Trevino, 2012). Also relevant to 
emphasize is the role of Leo Heileman. As one of Myer’s advisors in Geneva during UNFCCC 
negotiations, he was a marine chemist and thus, an expert that allowed for more specialized 
arguments (McDermott, 2013). Finally, the concept of vulnerability has been a flagship of all 
SIDS, including Trinidad and Tobago (Cooper & Shaw, 2009).  
 
Moral arguments. Several authors recognize the role of small states as norm 
entrepreneurs (Neumann & Gsthöl, 2004; Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Braveboy-Wagner, 2010; 
Benwell, 2011). The English-speaking CARICOM countries have especially been recognized for 
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this, with consistent records of stable governments and respect for international law and human 
rights as well (Braveboy-Wagner, 2010). Thus, moral arguments easily arise in the foreign policy 
of these states in negotiation scenarios.  
 
There are varied examples of moral arguments in the foreign policy portfolio of Trinidad 
and Tobago. Myers’ strategy in the UNFCCC negotiations was that of promoting the idea that 
“the very important issue of climate change overrides all other concerns.” (McDermott, 2013, p. 
575). In this way, small states somewhat become a moral authority, dictating the moral compass 
of climate change negotiations. To some extent, this idea, connected to the status of victimhood, 
allowing small state to “act above politics” (Benwell, 2011).  
 
Another moral argument of paramount importance to small states is that of their 
powerlessness to change the negative effects of climate change, calling themselves as “front-line 
states” referring to both their leadership and their status as the first (and imminent) victims 
(Benwell, 2011). Through the use of these arguments, small states seek to influence other states 
into a recognition of their victim status, and thus, to comply with the existing arrangements (and 
ideally, to support other small state claims). It is in this argument that authors like Benwell 
convey: “Small states’ power lies in their powerlessness” (Benwell, 2011, p. 207).  
 
Legal arguments. Small states rely on legal principles in general in order to level up the 
field in negotiation scenarios. These principles include self-determination, sovereign equality, 
non-interference and polluter pays principle among others (Cooper & Shaw, 2009; Corbin, 2009; 
Braveboy-Wagner, 2010; Benwell, 2011). Caribbean states, and especially Trinidad and Tobago 
have been very invested in promoting decolonization and self-determination inside all relevant 
UN bodies (Corbin, 2009; Braveboy-Wagner, 2010). Additionally, Trinidad and Tobago also 
promotes the previously mentioned principles in its actions with AOSIS and during several of its 
interventions in other international fora.  
 
Coalition building. Coalition building becomes particularly relevant for small states in a 
setting like the climate change negotiations. Trinidad and Tobago has pursued coalition building 
in different fronts, worth analyzing especially in terms of its incidence on the climate change 
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negotiations. Most of these actions are justified since Trinidad and Tobago has assumed the role 
of an intermediary between the English-speaking Caribbean and both the continental and global 
settings (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989). 
 
Trinidad’s participation within CARICOM is relevant when understanding its actions for 
coalition building. Such is the case that Trinidad and Tobago established a separate unit for 
CARICOM integration inside its ministry of foreign affairs (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989). This 
shows how Trinidad and Tobago wished to capitalize on CARICOM regionalism in order to 
further its interests in other scenarios. As Braveboy-Wagner defends: “The 1990s saw a turn 
toward enhanced outward-looking regionalism throughout most of the world, and as a result 
CARICOM refocused its energies on strengthening its integration arrangements” (Braveboy-
Wagner, 2009, p. 100). This greater role of integration within CARICOM in the 1990s definitely 
played a part during the formation of AOSIS, as can be understood further ahead. For example, 
Trinidad and Tobago adopted Spanish as a second language in the 2000s in order to become a 
bridge between CARICOM (mostly English-Speaking Caribbean) and the Latin American orbit 
(Braveboy-Wagner, 2010). Thus, these actions sought to strengthen Trinidad’s networks within 
the region, in order to strengthen its coalitions for multilateral scenarios like those in the UN.  
 
Trinidad and Tobago also pursued participation in another regional initiative, or rather a 
continental one. Trinidad was the first English-speaking country to join the OAS in 1967, paving 
the way for other Caribbean nations (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989; Braveboy-Wagner, 2010). This is 
relevant because the OAS was predominantly Latin American and the English Caribbean had 
been somewhat neglected. The OAS also became a relevant scenario for small state action in 
general because of the number of small state members, which has allowed them to attain a fairly 
noteworthy level of influence (Braveboy-Wagner, 2010). Inside OAS, Trinidad actively 
participated in agenda items such as removing restrictions on membership for Guyana and 
Belize, (because of their territorial disputes with Venezuela and Guatemala), an effort that 
became successful in 1990 when the OAS decided to review the restrictive article (Braveboy-
Wagner, 1989). This was another Trinidadian action for strengthening its networks with is 
neighbors, which has allowed it to garner support in UN elections, for example. Thus: “Trinidad 
has joined (…) as representative of the English-speaking nations as a group, representing the 
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Caribbean (and Latin America) on a number of UN committees, in particular the Group of 
Twenty-Four, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security Council” (Braveboy-Wagner, 
1989, p. 53). Nonetheless, little evidence exists to affirm whether or not the OAS membership 
has represented benefits for Trinidad and Tobago in climate change negotiations.  
 
However, the main example of coalition formation is the one that is directly related to 
climate change. AOSIS came to be after efforts started in 1990 and finalized in 1991 as a 
coalition of SIDS (Mohamed, 2002; Bily, 2010; Benwell, 2011; Berringer, 2012; McDermott, 
2013; AOSIS, 2015). This coalition is less institutionalized than an international organization 
like the OAS or the Commonwealth Foundation (as a unit of the Commonwealth). Likewise, 
AOSIS only speaks collectively through collaboration in UN structures, with members working 
through their Permanent Missions to the UN (Bily, 2010; Berringer, 2012).  
 
The reason behind AOSIS’ existence can be explained as SIDS felt that action through 
the G-77/China coalition denied them gaining the necessary support for their claims, and thus 
decided to leave their traditional negotiation allies of China and India (Benwell, 2011). AOSIS 
has a series of advantages as a coalition for small state foreign policy promotion. On one hand, 
37 of UN members are part of AOSIS (Bily, 2010). This makes it a more representative group 
inside UN organs and UN sponsored negotiations, than if small states were acting on their own.  
On the other hand: “AOSIS is notable for combining the Caribbean, Pacific, and the African, 
Indian Ocean and Mediterranean small island/low-lying coastal states and for its global sphere of 
activity” (Benwell, 2011, p. 201). Through this coalition, small states were able to collectively 
learn from each other, and use all of the different capacity building and shaping strategies in such 
a way that the benefits could be procured together.  
 
Trinidad and Tobago certainly could be considered the victor behind AOSIS due to several 
reasons. Trinidad and Tobago helped found AOSIS, as McDermott illustrates: 
“The effort began in a hotel room in Geneva in 1990, during a meeting prior to the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development, known as the Rio summit. Lincoln Myers, 
Trinidad’s then – Minister of Environment, and his two advisors agreed on a political strategy” 
(McDermott, 2013, p. 575).  
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As was previously mentioned, Trinidad and Tobago used this coalition as a way to frame its 
interests without jeopardizing its economic productivity. In order to adequately achieve framing, 
Trinidad and Tobago had the choice of allying with hydrocarbon producers or with world’s 
archipelagos, and ended up choosing the other extreme of power: those overwhelmed with 
vulnerability (McDermott, 2013). To some extent, Trinidad and Tobago could be considered an 
odd member of AOSIS because of its high per-capita emissions that were previously described. 
Thus, McDermott claims: “In fact, Trinidad and Tobago gained admission to this club by 
creating it. Otherwise, its own carbon emissions might have barred Port of Spain from 
membership” (McDermott, 2013, p. 575). The final important element to emphasize is 
Trinidadian leadership in AOSIS during Ambassador des Iles’ period as chairperson (Berringer, 
2012).  
 
As it was previously mentioned, Trinidad and Tobago also faced a series of failures in 
attaining its goals in coalition formation, as was shown with the reluctance of Caribbean nations 
to certain efforts of regionalism and the failed OPEC membership attempt (Braveboy-Wagner, 
1989).  
 
Bargaining. Bargaining is the most difficult strategy for small states to pull off, but 
Trinidad and Tobago counted with its petroleum reserves as a mechanism for generating 
influence. In this context, Trinidad and Tobago adopted initiatives like the 1980 Facility for 
Financing Oil, Fertilizer and Asphalt Purchases by CARICOM States (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989), 
as well as several financial policies (balance of payments subsidies, project aid, buying of bonds, 
contributions directly to the Caribbean Development Bank) (Braveboy-Wagner, 1989) 
 
Trinidad’s socioeconomic policy has given it some level of success, especially in terms of 
beneficial trade conditions in the region, dominating intra-CARICOM trade (Braveboy-Wagner, 
1989; Braveboy-Wagner, 2010). However, failure to attain a real influence is a reality that has 
been previously described. This can be especially true when one considers that certain Caribbean 
states may resent Trinidad’s status as the regions economic power (Braveboy-Wagner, 2010). 
Thus, it is possible to assert: “Trinidad and Tobago has used its economic resources largely to 
cement its regional rather than global leadership” (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009, p. 104). Therefore, 
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Trinidad and Tobago has limitedly used these bargaining strategies outside of the region, 
reducing its impact in climate change negotiations to only consolidate the Caribbean’s positions.  
 
Other non-traditional ways small states use bargaining strategies do exist however. One 
of these is through the leverage of diplomatic recognition, a situation that arose thanks to the 
issue of both Chinas (Prasad, 2009). With it, some states chose to establish diplomatic relations 
with one or the other side in order to attain benefits from the state they recognized. Hence, 
Trinidad and Tobago has benefited from its recognition of the People’s Republic of China 
(Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 2016b). Finally, since small states 
contribute little to the climate change threat (with exceptions have already explained), they can 
bargain very little with promised reductions (Benwell, 2011). In theory, this would allow them to 
act as “honest brokers”, strengthening their own moral arguments, and judging whether or not 
concessions by other states are fair. Nonetheless, it is questionable if this happens in actuality.  
 
Value-claiming. In relation to value-claiming strategies, small states have faced some 
mixed results. The most noticeable value-claiming action in Trinidad and Tobago’s foreign 
policy portfolio certainly was how it was the first Party to submit a draft protocol under the 
Berlin mandate (Benwell, 2011; McDermott, 2013). Through draft 
(FCCC/AGBM/1996/MISC.2), Trinidad and Tobago gave small states (and itself) the benefit of 
establishing the terms, conditions and basic premises for the negotiation to adopt a protocol to 
the UNFCC (which would eventually become the Kyoto Protocol). This style of negotiation has 
accompanied small states during all subsequent revisions of the UNFCCC and its following 
agreements. As Benwell argues: “Typically, as part of their ‘emergency’ negotiation style, 
AOSIS themselves were slightly ahead of the ‘next most radical’ negotiating position (often held 
by the EU), for example updating their temperature and GHG concentration targets to 1.58C and 
350 ppm” (Benwell, 2011, p. 205). With the adoption of these avant-garde strategies, small 
states seek to continue to set the agenda and gain the benefits of seeing other states only 
establishing counterproposals, instead of leading the debate (Benwell, 2011).  
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With the thorough analysis of Trinidad’s foreign policy portfolio, the following step is 
that of assessing the level of perceived success for the specific context of the Kyoto Protocol and 
its outcomes.  
 
 
Trinidad And Tobago’s Achievement Of Foreign Policy Objectives Through Policy Effects 
 
In order to understand to what extent the Trinidadian foreign policy agenda was 
institutionalized in the Kyoto Protocol, two concepts become particularly relevant. Goldstein and 
Keohane’s ideational approach to foreign policy assesses the role of ideas in foreign policy 
formation. These authors conclude that three types of policy results exist, from which this case 
study will focus in two: the creation of route maps and coordination of uncertainty. The first of 
these is achieved when a particular belief’s causal relations are understood, and a set of 
preferences is set to attain the objectives set by foreign policy (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). 
Thus, ideas operate as a pathway for states to understand a causal connection regarding foreign 
policy action and the expected mechanisms to attain specific results.  
 
The second effect consists of how these ideas shape the coordination of uncertainty 
through the institutionalization of beliefs. That is to say, unifying the roles of action, framing 
how a topic is managed and understanding the consecution of principles of foreign policy 
objectives (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). Accordingly, ideas become institutionalized when 
those beliefs are employed over time, and uncertainty is handled because of the expectation that 
individual gains are lower than those of consistent action (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993).  
 
Creation of Route Maps  
AOSIS, under the leadership of Vanuatu and Trinidad and Tobago, had an active and 
influential voice while drafting the UNFCCC at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 
(Baldacchino, 2009; Bily, 2010). Thanks to the nascent coalition, small states were able to 
promote their ideas inside of the negotiation setting. Some of these are the existence of a shared 
responsibility, the sense of urgency of climate change and the imminent vulnerability of small 
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states (Benwell, 2011). Nevertheless, the most important causal belief that Trinidad and Tobago 
and other small states promoted resides in the following:  
The first major achievement of small islands was to ensure their recognition as a distinct category 
in the UN. The term small island developing states was coined in 1992 at the Rio Conference and 
their special environmental and developmental needs are acknowledged in Chapter 17 (G) of 
Agenda 21 (Benwell, 2011, p. 203).  
Although prior to the Kyoto Protocol, these efforts cemented causal beliefs that would be crucial 
for small state foreign policy promotion, using the previously explained strategies while also 
paving the way for the creation of route maps.  
 
Additionally, the UNFCCC grounded other relevant causal beliefs that small states 
promoted and later empowered them:  
The Framework Convention provides the backbone of the climate regime and, by winning the 
inclusion of important normative principles, small states and other developing countries set a 
foundation for all subsequent discussions. The principles laid out in the Preamble and Article 3 
are equity; ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (Article 3(1)); the precautionary principle 
(Article 3(2)); and sustainable development (Article 3(4)) (Benwell, 2011, p. 204).  
Through the establishment of these principles, small states achieved the base for further 
negotiations, as well as the policy actions that they would seek, reaching not only the creation of 
route maps, but also a coordination of uncertainty.  
 
Another important idea that small states (and especially Trinidad and Tobago) promoted 
was that of how those that contribute the least to the global problem of climate change are among 
those that would suffer the most the negative effects (McDermott, 2013). In fact, 
institutionalizing this beliefs further allowed small states to make them heard because of their 
status of victimhood. The main beneficiary of this route map definitely was Trinidad and Tobago 
as was previously described in regards to its framing of the subject.   
 
As explained before, AOSIS also presented a draft protocol in the Berlin COP in 1995 
(Benwell, 2011; McDermott, 2013). Through it, ideas of a 20 percent reduction based on 1990 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions were promoted (Bily, 2010). As Bily notes: “Although the 
specifics of the so-called AOSIS Protocol were not adopted, the language and the vision of the 
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protocol informed subsequent negotiations leading to the Berlin Mandate and the Kyoto 
Protocol” (Bily, 2010, p. 44). Thus, most of the ideas Trinidad promoted made it into the causal 
belief system of the negotiation.  
 
To some extent, Trinidad and Tobago in unison with other small states achieved 
institutionalizing the idea that all states were required to make substantial changes to the way 
they conduct their affairs in regards to climate change (Benwell, 2011). However, the success 
and application of said belief is, at best, limited. As Benwell explains: “Small states’ lobbying 
has successfully raised awareness, but not enough to fulfill underlying goals” (Benwell, 2011, p. 
202). 
 
Nevertheless, the role of Trinidad and Tobago as a leading state of AOSIS is very 
relevant in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. It is unlikely that without its action and leadership in 
the intensive lobbying of AOSIS that the needs of SIDS would have been heard, especially in 
terms of adaptation and capacity building (Benwell, 2011). Thus, declaring the creation of route 
maps as a complete success or total failure is not in order, and a gray area is the most common 
conclusion.  
 
Coordination of Uncertainty 
All of the previously mentioned effects of created route maps reach some level of 
coordination of uncertainty. AOSIS managed to coordinate uncertainty also by persuading larger 
nations into fairness of their cause, thus achieving that international negotiations on climate 
change recognize that small states should be represented proportionately to the amount of risk 
they face (Bily, 2010).  
 
Another mechanism that has allowed small states to generate a coordination of 
uncertainty is the expectation of a call for nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), 
especially for developing countries (Benwell, 2011). The main area of success for Trinidad and 
Tobago and other small states I which they have achieved coordination of uncertainty is 
mitigation action (Benwell, 2011). 
 
	   32 
Coordination of uncertainty was also reached when AOSIS promoted the 2.8ºC limit to 
temperature increase in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations (Benwell, 2011). However, an 
interesting fact has arisen post-Kyoto. When success was reached in this front (with the adoption 
of the EU of this limit), SIDS have further lowered the figure to 1.58ºC, even beyond 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommendations (Benwell, 2011).  
 
However, the AOSIS founders did not initially foresee certain effects of the coordination 
of uncertainty, especially because they did not know how far the AOSIS coalition would go. As 
McDermott reveals: “Cropper and the other founders of AOSIS were not thinking of renewable 
energy and other reforms later considered vital: “Nobody knew where this would go, ” she 
recalled, “the whole thing evolved really” (McDermott, 2013, p. 575).  
 
Trinidad and Tobago’s Lessons: Preparing for What Comes Next 
 
Small states were considered a nuisance in the international system for a long time. 
Braveboy-Wagner explains:  
As late as 1977 the suggestion was made that small states should not be granted ‘full status and 
rights in the councils of the collective global community’ and they should not participate in the 
‘broader international conferences, organizations and affairs’, dealing with matters ‘distant to 
their national interest’ (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009, p. 97).  
Yet, times have changed and small states have reached possibilities of action as significant as 
having a seat in the COP Bureau, and many other examples.  
 
Trinidad and Tobago as a leading small state is relevant to determine that it is simply not 
true that small states are exclusively condemned to following and never promoting their own 
interests. As seen throughout this article, small states do face several vulnerabilities of different 
nature. Trinidad and Tobago is no exception, as it is a state faced with locational, bureaucratic 
and resource vulnerabilities. Although this small state faces numerable challenges, it also has had 
the blessing of counting with petroleum reserves, making it somewhat of an atypical small state. 
Nevertheless, Trinidad and Tobago’s actions in climate change negotiations demonstrates how 
small states can indeed overcome their own limitations, even if results may not be complete 
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successes. The question remains for future analysis on how other small states fare in 
international scenarios when not counting with the important resource that petroleum is. Yet, as 
this study also showed, counting with this resource was not the only tool at Trinidad’s disposal in 
order to garner some level of success while promoting its interests. The use of prioritization in 
the way of numerous capacity building and shaping strategies was determinant for achieving the 
attention to small states in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. Although this case study focused 
exclusively on Trinidad and Tobago, it is true that several other small states have also used these 
strategies in multiple negotiations; both in climate change related topics or completely unrelated.  
 
The current status of climate change negotiations is one that is hopefully picking up after 
some very slow years. Small states should be smart in capitalizing on this state of affairs, 
especially in order to achieve a more successful promotion of their own foreign policy agendas 
in order to ensure their survival. Will small states again guide international climate change 
negations in a similar fashion to that of when they drafter both the UNFCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol? The answer to this question will most likely be affirmative, once small states capitalize 
on their foreign policy portfolios like Trinidad and Tobago was able to do so in the past. The 
Paris Agreement is a much-needed breath of fresh air into a stagnated discussion, but small state 
maneuvers are becoming predictable, thus limiting their persuasive power. It is then that small 
states like Trinidad and Tobago should focus on detected this and plan ahead with a different set 
of strategies for subsequent negotiations. Only then will small states again manage an effective 
creation of route maps that will certainly coordinate the most pressing of uncertainties: whether 
their survival is fiction or reality.    
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